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Abstract 27 
 28 
When updating beliefs about their future prospects, people tend to disregard bad news. 29 
By combining fMRI with computational and dynamic causal modeling, we identified 30 
neurocircuitry mechanisms underlying this optimism bias to test for valence-guided belief 31 
formation. In each trial of the fMRI task, participants (n = 24, 10 male) estimated the base rate 32 
and their risks of experiencing negative future events, were confronted with the actual base 33 
rate, and finally had the opportunity to update their initial self-related risk estimate. We 34 
demonstrated an optimism bias by revealing greater belief updates in response to good over 35 
bad news (i.e., learning that the actual base rate is lower or higher than expected), while 36 
controlling for confounds (estimation error and personal relevance of the new information). 37 
Updating was favorable when the final belief about risks improved (or at least did not 38 
worsened) relative to the initial risk estimate. This valence of updating was encoded by the 39 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) associated with the valuation of rewards. Within the 40 
updating circuit, the vmPFC filtered the incoming signal in a valence-dependent manner and 41 
influenced the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Both the valence-encoding activity in 42 
the vmPFC and its influence on the dmPFC predicted individual magnitudes of the optimism 43 
bias. Our results indicate that updating was biased by the motivation to maximize desirable 44 
beliefs, mediated by the influence of the valuation system on further cognitive processing. 45 
Thus, while providing the very basis for human reasoning, belief formation is essentially 46 
distorted to promote desired conclusions.  47 
 3 
 
Significance Statement 48 
 49 
The question whether human reasoning is biased by desires and goals is crucial for everyday 50 
social, professional, and economic decisions. How much our belief formation is influenced by 51 
what we want to believe is, however, still debated. Our study confirms that belief updates are 52 
indeed optimistically biased. Critically, the bias depends on the recruitment of the brain 53 
valuation system and the influence of this system on neural regions involved in reasoning. 54 
These neurocircuit interactions support the notion that the motivation to maximize pleasant 55 
beliefs reinforces those cognitive processes that are most likely to yield the desired 56 
conclusion.  57 
 4 
 
Introduction 58 
 59 
Not only extrinsic rewards such as tasty food, but also internal processes such as 60 
desirable beliefs or positive emotions are expected to evoke pleasant states. Believing that one 61 
is attractive and intelligent (Eil and Rao, 2011; Korn et al., 2012), or that one’s future will be 62 
bright (Sharot et al., 2011), has a positive subjective value, which is why people tend to be 63 
motivated to maintain such beliefs (Sharot and Garrett, 2016a). In turn, the motivation to 64 
maximize pleasant beliefs has been hypothesized to reinforce those cognitive processes that 65 
are most likely to yield a desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Hughes and Zaki, 2015). 66 
However, motivational influences on reasoning have been controversially debated 67 
(Kunda, 1990; Shah et al., 2016; Sharot and Garrett, 2016b; Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). 68 
But how can we prove whether specific conclusions are reinforced by desires when these 69 
processes are hidden from direct observation and can operate outside of awareness (Tesser, 70 
2000)? One way is to identify systematic, valence-dependent biases in information 71 
integration. For instance, when participants were given new information relevant to their 72 
current belief, they were more likely to incorporate good than bad news (e.g., indicating a 73 
lower versus higher risk than initially expected) to update their belief (Sharot et al., 2011; 74 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2016a). Circumventing self-report, such asymmetric updating provides an 75 
individual index of the optimism bias by exploiting actual belief formation behavior. 76 
Another difficulty is that no reward has a fix subjective value, neither the extrinsic nor 77 
the intrinsic ones. Tasty food, for instance, is more pleasant during a hungry state. This is 78 
directly reflected in the activity of brain regions encoding the reward value such as the 79 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; Bartra et al., 2013; Chase et al., 2015): neurons in the 80 
vmPFC that fired in response to tasty food during a hungry state, no longer showed this 81 
response after satiety (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). Likewise, desirable beliefs may be more 82 
pleasant after threatening a person’s self-worth (Roese and Olson, 2007; Rudman et al., 83 
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2007). Indeed, the magnitude of the optimism bias substantially varied across the participants 84 
(e.g., Sharot et al., 2011; Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). We assume that the belief updating 85 
should be biased only in the subjects who indeed assign a positive value to avoiding 86 
threatening and enhancing desirable beliefs. This allows us to infer the current value of a 87 
specific reward (favorable beliefs) from the reinforcement of the behavior leading to this 88 
reward (updating biased towards favorable beliefs). 89 
The present study aims to demonstrate that desirable beliefs have an incentive salience 90 
and therefore can guide updates by influencing ongoing cognitive processing. To this end, 91 
neural circuits of belief updating were identified by using an established fMRI paradigm. 92 
Recently (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016a), we have shown that the vmPFC encoded the positive 93 
value of favorable self-related (but nor other-related) belief updates, indicating that the brain 94 
transforms beliefs into the same common value scale as classical rewards. Further, we isolated 95 
cognitive components and formally controlled for confounds using computational modeling to 96 
validate conclusions about valence-dependent update behavior (Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 97 
2017). Based on this previous work and the central role of the vmPFC in value encoding 98 
(Bartra et al., 2013; Chase et al., 2015), we hypothesized that the positive value of favorable 99 
updating would be encoded by the vmPFC. Moreover, we expected that only those 100 
individuals, who showed an optimism bias, will have a strong neural response to favorable 101 
updating. Finally, we used dynamic causal modeling to investigate mechanisms underlying 102 
valence-dependent updating. We hypothesized that the contexts of favorable and unfavorable 103 
updating would modulate coupling amongst regions recruited during updating, and that the 104 
identified valuation system would influence other regions involved in belief formation. Our 105 
results provide evidence for a motivationally biased belief formation that is mediated by the 106 
value encoding in the vmPFC, and the influence of the vmPFC on the dorsomedial prefrontal 107 
cortex.108 
 6 
 
Materials and Methods 109 
 110 
Participants 111 
 112 
Forty subjects were recruited from the institute’s subject database. A total of four 113 
participants was excluded because of problems with task performance. Two participants 114 
recognized that the base rates were manipulated, and one individual did not update estimates 115 
in 84% of trials (mean of the included sample = 30.09%, SD = 16.13; exclusion threshold = 116 
66.67%). Lastly, one participant updated estimates away from the presented base rate in 18% 117 
of trials indicating problems with task understanding (mean of the included sample = 2.66%, 118 
SD = 4.12; exclusion threshold = 15%). Data from another 12 participants were excluded due 119 
to excessive head movement in the MR scanner that exceeded a threshold of 1.5 framewise 120 
displacement (Power et al., 2012). This was necessary to account for increased sensitivity to 121 
motion-related artifacts in multiband acquisition for functional imaging (see below for 122 
acquisition parameters). Thus, in total 24 subjects were included into the analysis (10 male, 123 
mean age = 27.38, SD = 5.15). Notably, adding the 12 subjects with excessive motion to the 124 
sample of 24 subjects revealed the same behavioral results (see Results, Task Performance). 125 
 126 
Experimental Design 127 
 128 
The experiment was conducted during the acquisition of fMRI scans using Presenta-129 
tion 18.1 (Neurobehavioral Systems) and consisted of 80 trials with 80 different adverse life 130 
events (e.g., cancer or car theft). Participants began each trial with estimating the base rate of 131 
an adverse life event (eBR, see Figure 1). Next, they were asked to estimate their own likeli-132 
hood of experiencing the life event in their lifetime (first estimate, E1), and were subsequently 133 
presented with the actual base rate (BR). Subjects were instructed that the base rate refers to 134 
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the probability of the respective event occurring to persons of the same sex and age, living in 135 
the same socio-cultural environment, as determined by the German Federal Statistical Office 136 
(“Statistisches Bundesamt”). At the end of each trial, participants had to re-estimate their own 137 
risk (second estimate, E2). 138 
The critical behavioral measure was the size of the update, i.e., the difference between 139 
E1 and E2. Subjects were expected to update their first risk estimate after being confronted 140 
with a base rate different than the one they initially assumed. This difference between eBR 141 
and BR indicated the estimation error (EE; EE = |eBR – BR|). In half of the trials, BR was de-142 
sirable (better than expected, i.e., eBR > BR; good news, GOOD), and in the other half, BR 143 
was undesirable (worse than expected, i.e., eBR < BR; bad news, BAD). Notably, we ex-144 
pected participants to change their risk estimates on average toward the new information. That 145 
is, upon an actual base rate that is lower than expected, participants should decrease their risk 146 
estimates. Conversely, upon an actual base rate that is higher than expected, participants 147 
should increase their risk estimates. Indeed, updates toward the direction opposed to the new 148 
information were very rare (M = 2.66%, SD = 4.12). This is also reflected in the desirability-149 
dependent computation of updates that ensures that positive values indicate an update toward 150 
the new information equally for GOOD and BAD (see Table 1). Valence-dependent bias in 151 
updating was present when GOOD and BAD trials yielded different updates (i.e., mean updat-152 
eGOOD > mean updateBAD indicates an optimism bias). 153 
Participants were free to report a probability anywhere between 1 and 99%. Starting 154 
from 50% in eBR, they selected the desired probability by using two buttons to increase or de-155 
crease the number displayed on the screen (Figure 1, green font in eBR, E1, and E2), and a 156 
third button to confirm the selected choice. Subjects were instructed to use both hands. In the 157 
first half of the experiment they used the right hand for selecting the percentage number and 158 
 8 
 
the left hand for confirming it, and in the second half the other way around (order counter-bal-159 
anced across subjects). In E1, the starting number equaled the one selected in eBR, and in E2, 160 
the starting number corresponded to the one selected in E1. 161 
For eBR, E1, and E2, the response display was activated after a 2 s interval. Subjects 162 
were instructed to use the first 2 s to think about their estimate, and then had a maximum of 163 
10 s to respond (see Table 1 for mean RTs). BR was presented for 2 s. The intervals within 164 
and between the trials consisted of a fixation cross and were jittered (Mumford et al., 2015): 165 
the three inter-stimulus intervals within the trial (between eBR and E1, E1 and BR, and BR 166 
and E2) ranged between 2375 ms and 4625 ms, with a mean of 3500 ms, and the inter-trial in-167 
tervals ranged between 4875 ms and 7125 ms, with a mean of 6000 ms. The average task du-168 
ration was 48 min (SD = 2.45). 169 
GOOD and BAD trials were rendered comparable with respect to i) number of trials, 170 
ii) mean size of estimation error, and iii) range of actual base rates (BR). Furthermore, the 171 
assignment of stimuli to the two conditions (GOOD and BAD), the different estimation error 172 
sizes, and the order of trials were randomized anew for each subject. This was accomplished 173 
by manipulating the BR, unbeknownst to subjects. To generate a desirable BR, a number 174 
between 1 and 25 was subtracted from the estimated BR (eBR), and to generate an 175 
undesirable BR, a number between 1 and 25 was added to the eBR. In addition, BRs were 176 
capped between 1 and 90% because base rates exceeding this range are likely to appear 177 
implausible. 178 
However, this manipulation of BR was sometimes constrained by subjects’ responses. 179 
For instance, when the eBR was close to or greater than 90%, trials that were scheduled to 180 
generate bad news could not be realized (e.g., when eBR was 90%, no greater BR could be 181 
generated because BRs were capped between 1% and 90%). Instead, a number lower than 182 
90% was presented (a random number between 85% and 90%), generating good news. This 183 
reversal of the scheduled trial valence (M = 1.30, SD = 2.20) can be made responsible for the 184 
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condition-wise differences in number of trials (the reversal occurred only in BAD trials, 185 
thereby decreasing the number of realized BAD trials and increasing the number of realized 186 
GOOD trials), and eBR and E1 (only BAD trials with high eBRs were possible candidates for 187 
such a reversal, and eBR and E1 were highly correlated, as one would expect, see Figure 2E-188 
F). Supporting this assumption, number of trials and eBR differed between the conditions 189 
only in subjects with reversals (and/or EE = 0; t(11) = 2.68, p = .022, eBR, t(11) = 6.86, p < 190 
.001), but not in subjects without such irregularities (t(11) = 0.32, p = .755, eBR, t(11) = 2.06, 191 
p = .064). Notably, we nevertheless achieved satisfactory balanced distributions of number of 192 
trials, eBR, E1, and EE between conditions (e.g., on average 78.17 of 80 trials could be 193 
realized, and the mean difference between GOOD and BAD was 1.75 trials; see Table 1). 194 
Additional details on the experimental design and the BR manipulation algorithm have been 195 
described elsewhere (Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). 196 
Before the experiment, all participants received written instructions, and completed six 197 
practice trials with stimulus events not used in the experiment. In a final debriefing after the 198 
experiment, a funneled procedure was used to ensure that subjects did not suspect the 199 
manipulation of the base rates, or the purpose of the study. All procedures were in accordance 200 
with the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki and were approved by the local 201 
ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne, Germany (15-255). 202 
 203 
Acquisition parameters. The MRI data were acquired by using a Magnetom Trio 204 
Prismafit 3T whole body scanner and a 64-channel head coil (Siemens AG, Medical Solutions, 205 
Erlangen, Germany). During the update experiment, fMRI data were acquired in one session 206 
with a slice accelerated multiband echo planar imaging sequence (Xu et al., 2013) covering 207 
the whole brain (TR = 1050 ms, TE = 37.40 ms, field of view = 212 × 212 × 144 mm3, voxel 208 
size = 2 × 2 × 2 mm3, 72 oblique axial slices, multiband acceleration factor 6). In addition, we 209 
acquired two images with reversed phase encoding directions (anterior-posterior or posterior-210 
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anterior) for the purpose of estimating and correcting the susceptibility-induced distortion 211 
using topup (TR 8240 ms, TE 69 ms, field of view 212 × 212 × 144 mm3, voxel size 2 × 2 × 2 212 
mm3, 72 oblique axial slices). High-resolution T1-weighted images were obtained from the 213 
institute’s subject database (MDEFT, TR 1930 ms, TE 5.80 ms, field of view 256 × 256 × 160 214 
mm3, voxel size 1 × 1 × 1.25 mm3, 128 sagittal slices, or MPRAGE, TR 2300 ms, TE 2.32 215 
ms, field of view 256 × 256 × 192 mm3, voxel size 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm3, 213 sagittal slices). 216 
 217 
Statistical Analyses 218 
 219 
Analysis of Task Performance 220 
 221 
Prior to analyses, the following trials were excluded: trials with missing responses (M 222 
= 0.83, SD = 1.01), trials with EE = 0 (e.g., when eBR was 1% in a GOOD trial, BR was also 223 
1%; M = 0.88, SD = 1.26), and outliers (trials in which the update exceeded 4 SD of the 224 
subjects’ mean; M = 0.13, SD = 0.34). For each subject, trials were divided into two 225 
conditions: good news (GOOD; BR < eBR) and bad news (BAD; BR > eBR). Optimism bias 226 
was assessed by comparing updates in GOOD-trials with those in BAD-trials (mean 227 
updateGOOD – mean updateBAD). Note that on average participants were expected to decrease 228 
their risk estimates after good news and to increase their risk estimates after bad news. Thus, 229 
for both updateGOOD and updateBAD, positive values indicate an update towards the new 230 
information (see Table 1 for statistics of task variables; also see Figure 2A). Furthermore, for 231 
each participant, we conducted a linear regression to predict his or her updates on each trial 232 
using valence of news (GOOD vs. BAD), while including eBR, E1, and EE as covariates (all 233 
measures z-scored within subject). For repeated measures, the standard deviation of the paired 234 
differences was used as a standardizer for Cohen’s d (Cumming, 2014). 235 
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In addition, we performed computational modeling of belief updating. The model-236 
based approach allows to formally control for fluctuations in trial-wise eBR, E1, and EE 237 
across conditions, and to simulate unbiased updating based on observed trial-wise EE and 238 
personal relevance (PR). Building on previous work (Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017), the 239 
model of belief updating was formalized as follows: 240 
 241 
Update = LR * EE * PR 242 
With LRGOOD   = Alpha + Asymmetry 243 
         LRBAD     = Alpha – Asymmetry 244 
 245 
This model relies on the generic form of reinforcement learning, in which update is 246 
proportional to the estimation error EE (equivalent to prediction error). In addition, EE is 247 
weighted by the learning rate (LR), which indicates the general tendency of each subject to 248 
update their beliefs in response to the EE. In order to test for the optimism bias (asymmetric 249 
learning), LR was estimated separately for good and bad news (see also Palminteri et al., 250 
2016; Lefebvre et al., 2017) and therefore has two components. The general component, 251 
Alpha (α), indicates the tendency to learn from errors, independent of the valence of news. 252 
Alpha equal 1 indicates that update is exactly equal to EE, while α smaller than 1 indicates 253 
updates smaller than EE. Asymmetry (A) equal zero indicates equal learning rates for GOOD 254 
and BAD, while A different from zero indicates that the resulting learning rates systematically 255 
differ for GOOD and BAD (e.g., Asymmetry > zero indicates lower learning rates and hence 256 
smaller updates for BAD than for GOOD). 257 
EE is also weighted by the personal relevance (PR; corresponds to ‘relative personal 258 
knowledge’ in Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). PR indicates the difference between eBR and 259 
E1 relative to the maximal possible difference in each trial (see Table 1 for the exact 260 
equation). Recently, we have demonstrated that the computational model of belief updating 261 
 12 
 
that weighted EE with PR was superior to the model without any consideration of PR 262 
(Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). This shows that the more people felt detached from the 263 
reference population, the more irrelevant base rates became for their updates of risk estimates 264 
(e.g., if I do not have a car, I will not consider the base rate of car theft). PR ranged from 0 to 265 
1, with PR = 1 when a subject perceives her risk to be equal to those of the average person 266 
(eBR = E1, see Figure 1 for an example), and PR = 0 when the perceived difference (eBR vs. 267 
E1) is maximal. Thus, EE weighted by PR indicates a subjective error (SE), where the impact 268 
of the EE on update is also determined by the personal relevance of the new information. 269 
Using the VBA toolbox (Daunizeau et al., 2014), we implemented competing models 270 
and tested which of these best accounted for the observed update behavior. In order to test 271 
whether Alpha was different from 1 and whether Asymmetry was different from 0, we 272 
generated all possible variations of the update equation by switching the parameters Alpha 273 
and Asymmetry on (by letting the parameter free), or off (by fixing the parameter’s prior 274 
variance to zero). Thus, 4 models (αA, α, A, Ø; α and A indicate that the respective parameter 275 
was let free) were estimated for each subject. Note that by setting Asymmetry to 0 (i.e., 276 
models α and Ø) we specified the null hypothesis that learning is unbiased. In the alternative 277 
hypothesis (i.e., models αA and A), Asymmetry was estimated for each participant. Model 278 
estimations yielded a posterior distribution across the parameters, and an approximation to the 279 
evidence of the model. The approximated model evidence reflects the goodness of fit, 280 
penalized for the complexity. We used the Free-energy approximation that has been shown to 281 
be superior to other approximations like AIC or BIC (Penny, 2012). Model evidences of all 282 
subjects and all tested models were then entered in a random-effect Bayesian model 283 
comparison. For each model, this procedure estimates a) the probability of each subject to be 284 
best described by the respective model (model attributions), b) the frequency in the population 285 
(estimated model frequency, Ef), and c) the protected exceedance probability (pxp), which is 286 
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the probability that the model predominates in the population, above and beyond chance (see 287 
Rigoux et al., 2014 for more details). 288 
 289 
fMRI Analyses 290 
 291 
Prior to analysis, the first ten volumes were discarded to allow for magnetic saturation. 292 
First, functional images were corrected for motion and distortion using the FSL (version 293 
5.0.9) tools MCFLIRT and topup (Andersson et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2004). All further 294 
analysis steps including DCM were conducted using SPM12 (Wellcome Trust Centre for 295 
Neuroimaging, London, UK) implemented in MATLAB R2014b (The Mathworks Inc., 296 
Massachusetts, USA). The T1 image was normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute 297 
(MNI) reference space using the unified segmentation approach, and the ensuing deformation 298 
parameters were applied to (previously coregistered) functional images. Finally, functional 299 
images were smoothed using an 8 full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel. 300 
Statistical analyses were conducted in the framework of a general linear model 301 
(GLM). At the single-subject level, conditions were modeled using a boxcar reference vector 302 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function and its time derivative. 303 
Following events were modeled on separate regressors: eBR, E1, BR, E2, responses and rest. 304 
The duration of eBR, E1, BR, and E2 was always set to 2 s, as for events with responses (all 305 
except of BR) the response display was activated only after 2 s. Responses for all events were 306 
modeled on one regressor (duration from the onset of the response event to the confirmation 307 
button press, which was also the beginning of the next inter-stimulus-interval). The 308 
instruction to switch hands after the first half of trials, and the excluded trials (missing 309 
responses, EE = 0, and outliers; see Analysis of Task Performance), if present, were modeled 310 
on the ‘rest’ regressor. Motion parameters and a matrix with motion-outlier volumes 311 
(identified using the tool fsl_motion_outlier at a threshold of 4 SD of intensity differences 312 
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between subsequent volumes (Power et al., 2012)) were included as multiple regressors of no 313 
interest. Low-frequency signal drifts were filtered using a cutoff of 128 s. At the group-level, 314 
flexible factorial design and a significance threshold of p < .05, FWE-corrected at the peak 315 
level, with an extent threshold of 20 voxels were used. For the covariate analyses, we applied 316 
the same statistical threshold, but a lower extent threshold of 10 voxels. 317 
 318 
Error Tracking. We identified brain regions that encoded the errors experienced 319 
during the BR event. At that time, subjects were confronted with a different actual base rate 320 
than the one they have estimated (i.e., the difference between eBR and BR). In order to obtain 321 
the effects separately for GOOD and BAD, we split the BR trials into BRGOOD and BRBAD, 322 
and tested for parametric modulation (PM) by subjective error (SE = EE * PR, see Analysis of 323 
Task Performance). We focused on this subjective error processing because it was more 324 
relevant for the subsequent belief updating than the general error (i.e., EE; Kuzmanovic and 325 
Rigoux, 2017). The resulting 9 regressors (eBR, E1, BRGOOD, PM_errorGOOD, BRBAD, 326 
PM_errorBAD, E2, responses, and rest) were only weakly correlated (ݎҧs, averaged across 327 
subjects, between -.29 and .14), indicating efficient parameter estimation. At the single-328 
subject level, two contrast images were computed relative to the implicit baseline 329 
(PM_errorGOOD and PM_errorBAD) and entered into group-level analysis. At the group level, 330 
we identified those regions that exhibited increasing or decreasing activation with increasing 331 
subjective error in both GOOD and BAD trials (global conjunction). Furthermore, we 332 
explored differences between PM_errorGOOD and PM_errorBAD and reported global 333 
conjunction results for significant results to clarify whether the difference related to different 334 
magnitudes of the same modulation effect (e.g., the positive correlation between BOLD and 335 
error was stronger in BAD than in GOOD), or to modulation effects of opposite direction 336 
(e.g., the correlation between BOLD and error was positive in BAD, but negative in GOOD). 337 
In order to be able to illustrate group effects of different sizes of error on the BOLD signal, 338 
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we also computed a GLM that models three sizes of error (small, mid and large) on 3 separate 339 
regressors, separately for GOOD and BAD (Figure 3A, line chart). ‘Small’, ‘mid’, and ‘large’ 340 
categories were generated by dividing the sorted array of values into three subarrays that i) do 341 
not share same values, and ii) are maximally similar with respect to the number of elements 342 
(this procedure was the same for errors and update’, see below). Finally, we tested whether 343 
the extent of error tracking correlated with the learning rate component Alpha across subjects 344 
by conducting a covariate analysis with one contrast per subject (average effect of 345 
PM_errorGOOD and PM_errorBAD). 346 
 347 
The Valence of Updating. In order to identify brain regions that encoded the valence of 348 
updating, we focused on the E2 event because at that time subjects were deciding upon 349 
updating their initial belief. E2 trials were split into E2GOOD and E2BAD trials so that effects 350 
can be examined separately for GOOD and BAD. According to the valence of updating 351 
schematically shown in Figure 3B (gray box), we tested for the positive correlation between 352 
the BOLD-signal and update in GOOD trials, and for the negative correlation in BAD trials. 353 
To identify these opposed effects, we applied parametric modulation of E2GOOD and E2BAD, 354 
respectively, by update size. The advantage of the PM procedure is that it allows to adjust the 355 
effect of update for EE, PR, and other potential confounds (e.g., by including three 356 
orthogonalized parameters in the following order: PR, EE, update; Mumford et al., 2015). The 357 
resulting 13 regressors (eBR, E1, BR, E2GOOD, PM_PRGOOD, PM_EEGOOD, PM_updateGOOD, 358 
E2BAD, PM_PRBAD, PM_EEBAD, PM_updateBAD, responses, and rest) were only weakly 359 
correlated (ݎҧs, averaged across subjects, between -.29 and .03), indicating efficient parameter 360 
estimation. The only exception was the negative correlation between BR and response (ݎҧ = -361 
.49), which occurred because BR was the only event in the trial that was never associated with 362 
a subsequent motor response. Six contrast images were computed relative to the implicit 363 
baseline (PM_PR, PM_EE, and PM_update, separately for GOOD and BAD), and entered 364 
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into group-level analysis. At the group level, we identified those regions that exhibited both i) 365 
increasing activation with increasing updates in GOOD trials, as well as ii) increasing 366 
activation with decreasing updates in BAD trials, specified by the difference contrast 367 
(PM_updateGOOD > PM_updateBAD). In addition, we reported global conjunction results to 368 
clarify whether the difference related to different magnitudes of the same modulation effect 369 
(e.g., the positive correlation between BOLD and update was stronger in GOOD than in 370 
BAD), or to modulation effects of opposite direction (e.g., the correlation between BOLD and 371 
update was positive in GOOD, but negative in BAD). Moreover, we tested whether the 372 
magnitude of the favorable updating effect correlated with the optimism bias across subjects 373 
by conducting a covariate analysis with one contrast per subject (PM_updateGOOD > 374 
PM_updateBAD). 375 
Finally, we conducted two additional GLMs with categorical designs that split all 376 
trials into three sizes of update (small, mid, and large), separately for GOOD and BAD. To 377 
approximate the adjustment for EE within the modulation by update, we subtracted EE from 378 
update at each trial (update’ = update – EE). That way, we controlled for the general effect 379 
that updates tend to be larger after larger EE, which may confound with the valence effect. 380 
Note that dividing update by EE would not be optimal because all trials with an update equal 381 
zero (M = 30.09%, SD = 16.13) would have yielded zero as well, irrespective of EE. This 382 
would not be appropriate because meaningful differences between zero updates in response to 383 
EEs of different sizes (e.g., EE = 2 and EE = 20) would have been concealed. For each 384 
subject, the numbers of trials across the three categories of updates were kept as similar as 385 
possible (numbers of trials did not differ; GOOD: M = 13.32, SD = 0.85, F(2,69) = 0.58, p = 386 
.560; BAD: M = 12.74, SD = 1.02, F(2,69) = 0.09, p = .913). 387 
First, we used a GLM that modeled the three categories of update sizes separately for 388 
GOOD and BAD (six regressors) in order to be able to illustrate group effects of different 389 
sizes of updates on the BOLD signal (Figure 3B, line chart). Second, we used another 390 
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categorical GLM as a basis for the DCM analysis because the categorical levels can be more 391 
easily interpreted as inducing contextual modulatory effects in DCM than parametric 392 
variables (Stephan et al., 2010). According to the valence of updating schematically shown in 393 
Figure 3B (gray box), this GLM collapsed the different update sizes into three valence 394 
categories corresponding to unfavorable (smallGOOD and largeBAD updates, U), mid (mid 395 
updates, M) and favorable (largeGOOD and smallBAD updates, F) updating (Figure 3C). Three 396 
contrast images were computed relative to the implicit baseline (E2unfavorable, E2mid and 397 
E2favorable), and entered into group-level analysis. At the group level, we tested for brain 398 
regions that exhibited greater activation for favorable updates than for unfavorable updates 399 
(E2favorable > E2unfavorable). In addition, we identified those regions that were activated during 400 
updating independent of the valence (i.e., conjunction of all three levels of E2). 401 
 402 
DCM Analyses 403 
 404 
DCM represents a hypothesis-led approach to understand neural circuits underlying 405 
observed brain responses (Friston, 2011). We used DCM to estimate and infer causal 406 
interactions among brain regions involved in belief updating (i.e., during the E2 event). To 407 
this end, competing models with different intrinsic coupling between regions, and different 408 
task-dependent modulations of these couplings, were specified. Each model corresponded to a 409 
specific hypothesis about how observed data were caused, and Bayesian model selection was 410 
used to quantify the evidence for one model over another (Friston, 2011). Model inversion 411 
provided estimates of the model evidence and the corresponding effective connectivity. We 412 
tested whether the context of favorable and unfavorable updating modulated the coupling 413 
between distributed brain responses, and whether value-coding regions exerted influence on 414 
other regions associated with cognitive processing. 415 
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First, we selected the nodes for the DCM based on the group results revealed by the 416 
simplified categorical GLM with three categories of valence of updates (unfavorable, mid and 417 
favorable). The time series were extracted by computing the principal eigenvariate from 4 mm 418 
diameter spheres (33 voxels) centered on the peak coordinates and adjusted for the effect of 419 
interest (F-contrast across the three categories of updates and the respective time derivatives). 420 
Second, we specified competing models varying in their endogenous coupling and 421 
valence-dependent modulatory effects and inverted each model for every subject. Given that 422 
every brain region is connected reciprocally (Friston, 2011), the coupling in all models was 423 
cyclic, i.e., all forward connections were accompanied by respective backward connections. 424 
We used a random-effect Bayesian model comparison to infer the optimal model structure by 425 
selecting the model with the best balance between accuracy and complexity. 426 
Third, following the model selection, we performed a random-effect analysis of 427 
parameter estimates derived from the selected model using one-sample t-tests (Stephan et al., 428 
2010). Additionally, we tested for correlations between parameter estimates and the optimism 429 
bias. For the sake of completeness, we report correlations between the two bias measures 430 
(optimism bias and Asymmetry) and all model parameters in Table 4. Bonferroni correction 431 
was used to control for multiple comparisons: significance thresholds were adjusted for 7 tests 432 
for the matrix A parameters (p < .007), and 2 tests for the expected correlations (p < .025). 433 
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Results 434 
 435 
Task Performance 436 
 437 
In the belief update task, subjects were asked to reconsider their risk estimates after 438 
being confronted with either good news (base rates of the risks were lower than initially 439 
expected), or bad news (base rates were higher than initially expected; Figure 1). In order to 440 
assess valence-biased belief updating, we first tested whether subjects were more likely to 441 
take into account good news (GOOD) rather than bad news (BAD). Indeed, belief updates 442 
(the difference between the self-related risk estimates before and after being presented with 443 
the actual base rate) following good news were significantly larger than the updates after bad 444 
news, t(23) = 2.12, p = .045, paired t-test, d = 0.43 (Figure 2A, see Table 1 for the summary 445 
of all task variables). Furthermore, linear regression analyses revealed that updates were 446 
larger in GOOD than in BAD trials even after controlling for trial-wise estimation error (EE), 447 
t(23) = 3.03, p = .006, d = 0.62, or for estimated base rate (eBR), first self-related risk 448 
estimate (E1) and EE, t(23) = 2.55, p = .018, d = 0.52, one-sample t-tests. Thus, these results 449 
indicate that belief updates were optimistically biased. 450 
In order to implement an even more precise control for potential confounds, and to 451 
further inform the fMRI analyses, we applied computational modeling. We tested whether the 452 
learning from actual base rates was asymmetric (different for GOOD and BAD, indicated by 453 
the parameter Asymmetry) while taking into account the EE, the personal relevance of the new 454 
information (PR), and the general tendency to learn from new information (learning rate 455 
component Alpha). Here, the EE was an important confound because larger errors generally 456 
tend to trigger larger updates. Also, when the new information is not regarded as personally 457 
relevant, updating of related beliefs tends to be reduced. 458 
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Bayesian model comparison of four competing models (αA, α, A, Ø) provided 459 
additional support for the optimism bias. It revealed that the ‘αA’-model, that estimated both 460 
Alpha and its Asymmetry separately for each subject, predicted subjects’ behavior 461 
significantly better than all other model versions (α, Alpha fitted, Asymmetry fixed to 0; A, 462 
Alpha fixed to 1, Asymmetry fitted; or Ø, Alpha fixed to 1 and Asymmetry fixed to 0), Ef = 463 
.87, pxp = .994 (Figure 2B). Asymmetry was significantly larger than zero, M = 0.05, SD = 464 
0.07, t(23) = 3.59, p = .002, one-sample t-test, d = 0.73, showing that participants’ learning 465 
rates were higher in response to good news than to bad news (LRGOOD: M = 0.79, SD = 0.19, 466 
LRBAD: M = 0.70, SD = 0.18; Figure 2C). Furthermore, Alpha was significantly smaller than 467 
1, M = 0.74, SD = 0.18, t(23) = -7.18, p < .001, one-sample t-test, d = 4.26, showing that 468 
updates were on average smaller than the estimation errors. Finally, the optimism bias 469 
(derived from the observed task performance, mean updateGOOD – mean updateBAD) and the 470 
Asymmetry parameter (derived by the winning model ‘αA’) were significantly correlated, r = 471 
.79, p < .001 (Figure 2D). While expected, the close relationship between these two bias 472 
measures also confirmed that the potential confounding variables (EE, PR) had no systematic 473 
influence in our task. Thus, we can rule out that “seemingly optimistic updating” was induced 474 
by a differential consideration of estimation errors due to varying personal relevance (Shah et 475 
al., 2016, p. 92). Quite the contrary, the optimism bias was even stronger after taking EE and 476 
PR into account. Thus, it is likely that earlier studies demonstrating the optimism bias, but 477 
lacking the enhanced experimental or formal computational control (Sharot et al., 2011; 478 
Sharot et al., 2012; Garrett et al., 2014; Korn et al., 2014; Kuzmanovic et al., 2015, 2016a; 479 
Kuzmanovic et al., 2016b), are also not affected by these potential confounds. Furthermore, 480 
correlations between the different task variables, computed separately for trials with good 481 
news and bad news and then averaged across subjects (Figure 2E-F), show that EE and 482 
updates correlated only very weakly with eBR, BR, E1, and E2 (ݎҧs ranging from -.15 to .30). 483 
This is particularly important as it demonstrates that we succeeded in manipulating the 484 
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desirability of EE independently of prior beliefs (i.e., the size of risk estimates eBR and E1). 485 
Furthermore, it shows that the valence of updates was independent of the size of the estimated 486 
risks (eBR, E1) or the presented base rates (BR). Together, these findings provide a strong 487 
support for the notion that the difference in updating indeed reflected a valence-dependent 488 
consideration of the new information. 489 
Moreover, we assessed the updates that were simulated by the winning model ‘αA’ 490 
assuming asymmetric learning rates, and by the unbiased model ‘α’, given the trial-by-trial 491 
PR and EE. The updates simulated by the model ‘αA’ corresponded well to the actually 492 
observed updates (MGOOD = 7.59, SD = 2.43; MBAD = 6.49, SD = 2.09, see white dots in 493 
Figure 2A) and were larger in GOOD than in BAD trials, t(23) = 3.85, p = .001, paired t-test, 494 
d = 0.79. In contrast, the updates simulated by the unbiased model ‘α’ did not differ across 495 
GOOD and BAD trial (MGOOD = 7.06, SD = 2.21; MBAD = 7.02, SD = 2.20, t(23) = 0.22, p = 496 
.830, paired t-test, d = 0.04; see gray dots in Figure 2A). This comparison proves that 497 
subjects’ asymmetric updating represents a true bias attributable to the different valence of the 498 
new information (good and bad news) and cannot be explained by any variations of other 499 
trial-by-trial variables (i.e., PR or EE; see Shah et al., 2016; Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). 500 
Furthermore, we compared floor and ceiling effects across GOOD and BAD and 501 
showed that controlling for these effects even enhanced the optimism bias effect. Floor and 502 
ceiling effects could occur if the size of the possible update was limited by the response scale 503 
(probabilities from 1% to 99%). For example, in a GOOD trial, given an EE = 5 (e.g., eBR = 504 
10%, BR = 5%) and an E1 = 3%, a subject would have only a limited space on the response 505 
scale to make an update toward a lower risk estimate (from E1 = 3% to the end of the 506 
response scale of 1%). Critically, this possible update should be at least as large as the size of 507 
the estimation error in order to enable unconstrained updating. This is rather conservative 508 
because the general learning rate component Alpha was significantly smaller than 1 and 509 
because EE were also weighted by personal relevance that ranged between 0 and 1. In order to 510 
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test for floor and ceiling effects, we computed the size of possible update relative to EE for 511 
each trial (updspace-EEGOOD = (E1-1) - EE; updspace-EEBAD = (99-E1) - EE). Updspace-EE 512 
was lower in GOOD than in BAD, t(23) = -4.50, p < .001 (MGOOD = 28.24, SD = 11.03; MBAD 513 
= 47.31, SD = 10.51). Furthermore, the number of constrained update spaces (updspace-EE < 514 
0) was higher in GOOD than in BAD, t(23) = 5.08, p < .001 (MGOOD = 6.17, SD = 5.45; MBAD 515 
= 0.58, SD = 0.77). Repeating the analyses after excluding the trials with a constrained update 516 
space revealed an even stronger optimism bias effect, t(23) = 3.54, p = .002, paired t-test, d = 517 
0.72, MGOOD = 8.20, SD = 2.64; MBAD = 6.80, SD = 2.23, also when after controlling for trial-518 
wise EE, t(23) = 4.67, p < .001, d = 0.95, or for eBR, E1 and EE, t(23) = 4.10, p < .001, d = 519 
0.84, one-sample t-tests. Computational modeling analyses were not affected by the exclusion 520 
of trials with constrained updating due to formal consideration of the personal relevance: 521 
Asymmetry derived from the ‘αA’-model (Ef = .86, pxp = .991) was significantly larger than 522 
zero, t(35) = 3.50, p = .002, one-sample t-test, d = 0.72. Taken together, these tests show that 523 
the optimism bias effect was underestimated because of greater floor effects in GOOD trials. 524 
We also examined the behavioral results after adding the 12 subjects with excessive 525 
motion to the sample of 24 subjects. These analyses yielded the same results as those with 526 
n=24. Belief updates following good news were significantly larger than the updates after bad 527 
news, t(35) = 3.18, p = .003, paired t-test, d = 0.53; Asymmetry was significantly larger than 528 
zero, t(35) = 4.35, p < .001, one-sample t-test, d = 0.73. Finally, the post-experimental 529 
debriefing revealed that none of the included subjects suspected that the purpose of the task 530 
was to assess difference in belief updating depending on the valence of the new information. 531 
At the end of the debriefing, we carefully explained the purpose of the study as well as the 532 
manipulation of the base rates in a standardized written form. Following this information, 533 
only one subject reported that he was aware of the good news-bad news effect during the own 534 
task performance. Furthermore, two subjects reported that they had no concerns with respect 535 
to the presented base rates during the task, the majority (17) reported that they were surprised 536 
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by some of the presented base rates but did not doubt their validity, five subjects doubted that 537 
single surprising base rates were really valid, and none of the included subjects reported 538 
having realized that the base rates were manipulated. 539 
 540 
fMRI Results 541 
 542 
Error Tracking During BR. Updating beliefs about self-related risks was triggered by 543 
erroneous expectations regarding the respective base rates. In order to investigate this crucial 544 
process, we identified brain regions that tracked the errors experienced upon the presentation 545 
of the actual base rates. The parametric modulation (PM) analysis revealed that error tracking 546 
recruited the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the anterior 547 
insula, the middle orbital gyrus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC; Table 2 548 
contrast 1b, and Figure 3A). In these regions, the activity increased with decreasing error size 549 
(negative correlation between BOLD and error) for both conditions GOOD and BAD (for an 550 
example, see the line chart in Figure 3A for the average activity in dlPFC across three sizes 551 
of error). This negative correlation seems unexpected because brain regions such as the ACC 552 
and the anterior insula have been associated with error processing, novelty, and task difficulty 553 
(Wessel et al., 2012; Klein et al., 2013; Shenhav et al., 2014; Kolling et al., 2016; Bastin et 554 
al., 2017; Fouragnan et al., 2017), and thus were expected to increase activity with increasing 555 
error size. However, a seminal study on belief updating has also demonstrated negative 556 
correlation between estimation error size and activity in the IFG, which was moreover 557 
predictive of trait optimism (Sharot et al., 2011). Thus, it may be necessary to reconsider the 558 
meaning of different outcomes in the specific context of the present experiment, because 559 
contexts determine the reference point for values of options (Palminteri et al., 2015). 560 
Subjects’ task and their ‘default option’ was to revisit their prior beliefs due to new 561 
challenging information. Thus, in the majority of trials, subjects indeed were confronted with 562 
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base rates that markedly differed from what they expected and they updated their belief. 563 
Relative to this, encountering trials with a small error increases the difficulty of the decision 564 
whether to update beliefs (“Is the actual base rate different enough than expected, and is this 565 
difference relevant enough to drive an update of my own risk?”). Given the high accuracy of 566 
subjects’ base rate estimations in such trials, the alternative course of action to refrain from 567 
updating becomes increasingly valuable. We therefore speculate that increased activity in this 568 
network relates to enhanced initial comparison process that informs subsequent decisions 569 
about updating while maintaining behavioral flexibility (Kolling et al., 2016). 570 
Furthermore, of all these error-tracking regions, only the activity in dlPFC correlated 571 
with the learning rate component Alpha (covariate analysis masked with the conjunction 572 
contrast PM_errorGOOD and PM_errorBAD, negative correlation; Table 2 contrast 2). Betas 573 
indicating the strength of the linear relationship between error and BOLD were extracted for 574 
each subject (PM analysis, at the peak [40 38 30], averaged across PM_errorGOOD and 575 
PM_errorBAD), and plotted against Alpha for illustrative purposes (scatter plot in Figure 3A). 576 
Even when conducting the covariate analysis for the whole brain, an overlapping dlPFC 577 
cluster had the strongest correlation with Alpha (peak at [38 30 38], T = 5.66, 257 voxels), 578 
albeit at a more liberal significance threshold (p < .05, FWE-corrected at the cluster level). 579 
 580 
The Valence of Updating. The main aim of the fMRI analysis was to identify brain 581 
regions that encoded the valence of updating. The valence of updating was defined based on 582 
how much the second estimation resulted in either favorable or unfavorable risk estimates, 583 
relative to the first estimation (see Figure 3B, gray box, for an illustration). Note that in 584 
GOOD trials, initial risk estimates were expected to decrease toward the actual base rate that 585 
was lower than expected. Conversely, in BAD trials, risk estimates were expected to increase 586 
toward the actual base rate that was higher than expected. In consequence, for GOOD trials, 587 
we assume that large updates would be experienced as favorable, because they result in lower 588 
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final risk estimates. In contrast, for BAD trials, we assume that small (or zero) updates would 589 
be experienced as favorable, because they prevent an increase of final risk estimates. Hence, 590 
we expected a positive correlation between the BOLD-signal and update in GOOD trials, and 591 
a negative correlation in BAD trials. 592 
The parametric modulation analysis revealed that activity in the vmPFC had exactly 593 
this pattern (Figure 3B and Table 3, contrast 1a), indicating that this region tracked favorable 594 
updating. The correlation between the BOLD-signal in the vmPFC and update was greater in 595 
trials with good news than in trials with bad news (i.e., PM_updateGOOD > PM_updateBAD). 596 
The conjunction contrast (i.e., PM_updateGOOD, positive correlation & PM_updateBAD, 597 
negative correlation) confirmed that this effect implied contrary modulation effects for GOOD 598 
and BAD (positive correlation in GOOD, and negative correlation in BAD; see the line chart 599 
in Figure 3B). Moreover, the vmPFC was also the only area in the whole brain, in which the 600 
magnitude of this valence-tracking effect correlated with the optimism bias (Table 3, 601 
contrasts 2a-b). This relationship to the task performance was illustrated by extracting betas 602 
indicating the strength of the differential linear relationship between update and BOLD for 603 
each subject (PM analysis, at the peak -6 50 -18, PM_ErrorGOOD > PM_ErrorBAD), and 604 
plotting them against optimism bias (Figure 3B, scatter plot). 605 
Importantly, by including multiple orthogonalized parameters, we assessed variance 606 
that was uniquely explained by different update sizes, above and beyond the effects of other 607 
relevant computational components of belief updating such as EE and PR (Mumford et al., 608 
2015). Moreover, the valence-tracking effect in the vmPFC was significant even when we 609 
controlled for task variables other than EE and PR. Repeating the parametric modulation 610 
analysis while including BR as an additional regressor (four orthogonalized regressors: BR, 611 
PR, EE, update, separately for GOOD and BAD) yielded the involvement of the same vmPFC 612 
clusters for the three contrasts indicating the valence effect (see Table 3, 1a including the 613 
conjunction and 2b; significance threshold as in the main analysis). In addition, including BR 614 
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and E2 (five orthogonalized regressors: E2, BR, PR, EE, update, separately for GOOD and 615 
BAD) also confirmed the valence-tracking effect in the vmPFC with respect to all three 616 
contrasts (albeit the contrast 2b at a less stringent significance threshold of p < .001, 617 
uncorrected, cluster size 216). Thus, in contrast to previous studies investigating the 618 
rewarding effect of favorable new information per se (in the context of updating self-619 
evaluations; Korn et al., 2012), the valence effect related to the relative improvement or 620 
worsening of initial beliefs, but not to the valence of final beliefs (E2) or the new information 621 
(BR), or to other variables (PR, or EE). 622 
Once we have demonstrated the effect of favorable updating while adjusting for BR, 623 
E2, EE and PR using parametric modulation, we repeated the analysis with a simplified 624 
categorical model. Discrete levels of valence (e.g., unfavorable or favorable) can then be used 625 
in the following DCM analysis to specify contextual effects that modulate the intrinsic 626 
coupling within the update circuit. According to the principle introduced above (and in the 627 
gray box in Figure 3B), we specified three valence levels (Figure 3C): unfavorable updating 628 
(U, smallGOOD and largeBAD updates), mid updating (M, mid updates) and favorable updating 629 
(F, largeGOOD and smallBAD updates). As a result, we concatenated the valence of updates 630 
across trials with good and bad news. The simplified categorical analysis revealed similar 631 
results as the PM analysis, demonstrating greater activity in the vmPFC for favorable than for 632 
unfavorable updates (Figure 3C and Table 3, contrast 3a). Moreover, the dmPFC showed a 633 
similar pattern of activity as the vmPFC. In addition, we tested for the conjunction effect 634 
across all three valence categories to identify brain regions that were generally activated 635 
during updating, independent of valence. General updating revealed widespread activations 636 
including occipital, parietal and frontal cortices (Figure 3C and Table 3, contrast 3c). 637 
 638 
The Timing of Updating. In order to explore whether the valence effect of updating did 639 
manifest already during the processing of BR, we repeated the parametric modulation analysis 640 
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(including PR, EE, and update), but defined the event BR instead of E2 as the unmodulated 641 
regressor. In this analysis, the contrast PM_updateGOOD > PM_updateBAD did not yield any 642 
significant effect, even when using the vmPFC cluster as an inclusive mask at a less stringent 643 
significance level (p < .001, uncorrected). This indicates that the encoding of the valence of 644 
belief updating by the vmPFC indeed occurred during the period of update consideration and 645 
not already during the reception of the new information.  646 
This contradicts classical reinforcement tasks where belief updating is expected to 647 
occur upon a relevant outcome (e.g., if I choose the green and not the red square and win 648 
money, I update the value of choosing the green square immediately). However, there is a 649 
substantial qualitative difference between classical reinforcement tasks and the present task. 650 
Estimations of base rates of life events in a population recruit declarative memory to retrieve 651 
general knowledge, and the feedback about the actual base rates indicates how accurate one 652 
was. Furthermore, estimating one’s own risks of experiencing adverse events in the future 653 
represents a more complex cognitive process (including autobiographic and declarative 654 
memory) than deciding whether to choose a green or a red square in a gambling game. Thus, 655 
it is plausible that subjects focused on their degree of accuracy at the time point of feedback 656 
and subsequently focused on the meaning of this new information for their own risk estimate. 657 
Several arguments additionally support this notion. First, we explicitly instructed the 658 
subjects to reconsider their risk estimates during the “update phase” (first two seconds of E2, 659 
before the response buttons were activated, see Figure 1). Second, there was no need to 660 
memorize estimated and actual base rates (or first self-risk estimates) until the update phase 661 
because all preceding values were visible on the screen at all times (see Figure 1). Third, 662 
during the debriefing, a majority of subjects spontaneously reported that they were pleased to 663 
see that they were often quite accurate in estimating the base rates. And forth, inspecting the 664 
encoding of estimation errors upon presenting the actual base rates (i.e., parametric 665 
modulation of actual base rate presentation by orthogonalized PR and EE) revealed that the 666 
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activity in the bilateral ventral striatum was higher the smaller the estimation errors were (the 667 
more accurate the subjects were), irrespective of their personal relevance or desirability (i.e., 668 
for both good news and bad news; left striatum [-12 14 -6], 68 voxel; right striatum [14 12 -669 
6], 73 voxel; p < .05, FWE-corr. at the peak level for the whole brain). The ventral striatum 670 
plays a central role in encoding positive prediction errors (Chase et al., 2015). In the context 671 
of a task where subjects estimated base rates and were confronted with actual base rates that 672 
differed from their own estimates to a varying extent, greater accuracy corresponded to 673 
positive prediction error. Together with the debriefing self-reports, this finding supports the 674 
assumption that subjects focused on the degree of their accuracy during the presentation of 675 
base rates and thus were likely to reconsider their own risks subsequently, at a segregated 676 
time point. 677 
 678 
DCM results 679 
 680 
After identifying the vmPFC as the valuation area in the context of belief updating, we 681 
applied DCM to test competing hypotheses about its causal role within the update circuit. 682 
First, we selected three nodes for the DCM based on the update-related group results revealed 683 
by the simplified categorical analysis (Figure 3C and Table 3, contrasts 3a-c). The first node 684 
was the dlPFC. This region was involved both in general updating (conjunction across all 685 
update categories, Figure 3C), as well as in tracking errors in relevant prior beliefs (regarding 686 
BR) that was predictive of individual learning rates (Figure 3A). Thus, within the network 687 
activated by general updating, we chose the peak nearest to the learning rate-associated error 688 
tracking effect (MNI peak coordinate [44 42 26]). In order to further ensure that the chosen 689 
dlPFC peak was indeed specifically recruited by updating, we contrasted the three E2 690 
categories with E1 (second versus first self-risk estimation). In a separate group-level analysis 691 
with four contrast images (E2unfavorable, E2mid and E2favorable, E1) we identified those regions 692 
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that were more activated during updating beliefs about risks than during forming initial beliefs 693 
about risks (i.e., E2unfavorable, E2mid and E2favorable > E1, contrast [1 1 1 -3]). Note that E1 and 694 
E2 were otherwise comparable with respect to visual and motor requirements (see Figure 1). 695 
This additional analysis confirmed that the dlPFC was significantly activated during belief 696 
updating relative to initial belief formation (p < .05, FWE-corr. at the peak level for the whole 697 
brain). Importantly, the dlPFC cluster overlapped with both the general updating conjunction 698 
effect and the error tracking effect. Given that the dlPFC is a crucial part of the working 699 
memory system for transient storage and manipulation of information (Eriksson et al., 2015), 700 
this region represents a key candidate for maintaining integrative information processing 701 
generally necessary for belief updating. We therefore refer to the dlPFC as the valence-702 
independent “update processing” node. The second node was the vmPFC (MNI peak 703 
coordinate [-2 46 -22]). Its activity was greater in response to favorable than unfavorable 704 
updates, and this valence-coding effect predicted the individual magnitudes of the optimism 705 
bias (Figure 3B-C), thus forming a “valuation” node. Finally, we defined the dmPFC as our 706 
third node (MNI peak coordinate [-16 44 40]). This region demonstrated a similar activity 707 
pattern as the vmPFC in the categorical GLM (Figure 3C), but, in contrast to vmPFC, it has 708 
been associated with cognitive processes such as social inferences and perspective taking, and 709 
less so with reward processing (Bzdok et al., 2013; de la Vega et al., 2016). Thus, we will 710 
tentatively refer to the dmPFC as the “cognitive” node.  711 
This simple architecture comprising three nodes allowed us to compare different 712 
models that implied either valence-guided or non-valence-guided explanations for the 713 
observed brain responses. Valence-guided explanations would be favored if the vmPFC were 714 
the source of both i) the valence-dependent filtering of the general update-processing signal 715 
and ii) the subsequent influence on other prefrontal regions. Alternatively, non-valence-716 
guided explanations would be supported if the vmPFC would i) receive a signal that is already 717 
modulated in a valence-dependent manner and ii) have no driving influence on other 718 
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prefrontal regions. Thus, adopting a hypothesis driven approach, we limited our model space 719 
to ten DCMs corresponding to these competing theories about the neural processing of belief 720 
updating (Figure 4A). Although we could in principle construct a higher number of possible 721 
models, including more models would mainly obfuscate our analysis as additional alternative 722 
models would not be realistic (e.g., disconnected nodes), or be prone to overfitting while 723 
unable to provide a conclusive answer to our research question (e.g., valence modulates all 724 
connections). 725 
In all ten models, the event corresponding to the second risk estimation (E2, all three 726 
categories of updates) was specified as the exogenous input (Figure 4A). This input entered 727 
the dlPFC (matrix C in DCM) because this region showed increased activity during all 728 
categories of belief updating (see the line chart in Figure 3C). The models differed in their 729 
endogenous coupling (matrix A in DCM) such that m1 to m5 assumed a flow of neuronal 730 
states from dlPFC via vmPFC to dmPFC, while in models m6 to m10 the flow was from 731 
dlPFC via dmPFC to vmPFC. Given that we expected that the vmPFC would influence the 732 
dmPFC, models m6 to m10 represented null-hypotheses assuming the opposite course of 733 
influence. Furthermore, we systematically selected each of the possible coupling parameters 734 
to be the target of the valence-dependent modulation (matrix B in DCM; unfavorable 735 
updating, U or favorable updating, F). Given that we expected that favorable and unfavorable 736 
updating would differentially modulate the coupling in the network, m5 and m10 represented 737 
null-hypotheses assuming no modulation at all. More specifically, we hypothesized that 738 
valence encoding would manifest through filtering of the incoming signal by the vmPFC, and 739 
that the resulting differential valuation would further influence dmPFC, as formalized in m1. 740 
Alternatively, the valence-dependent modulation could have affected one of the other 741 
couplings (e.g., from dlPFC to dmPFC as formalized in m6). In these cases, the filtering of the 742 
incoming signal would not be attributed to vmPFC, and/or there would be no primary 743 
influence of the vmPFC on dmPFC. Notably, all models except of m5 and m10 were equally 744 
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complex but differed with respect to the flow of neuronal states and the coupling which was 745 
subject to contextual modulation, allowing for evidence-based hypothesis testing. 746 
Bayesian model comparison confirmed that the model m1 had the greatest evidence, 747 
above and beyond chance, Ef = .77, pxp = .999 (Figure 4B). The selected model assumed a 748 
cyclic signal flow from the dlPFC via vmPFC to dmPFC and a valence-dependent modulation 749 
of the coupling from dlPFC to vmPFC. The low evidence of models without modulations (m5 750 
and m10) indicates that the valence-dependent modulation of effective connectivity was 751 
indeed necessary to adequately predict subjects’ network activity. Furthermore, of the eight 752 
models with modulations, m1 still had a profoundly higher evidence than m6 and other 753 
alternative models. This finding supports the hypothesis that the vmPFC filtered the incoming 754 
signal in a valence-dependent manner and influenced the dmPFC. 755 
Third, we further inspected and analyzed the parameter estimates derived from the 756 
winning model m1. We hypothesized that the magnitude of valence-dependent modulation 757 
(the difference between F and U, F-U) of the dlPFC-vmPFC coupling would correlate with 758 
the optimism bias across subjects, because the stronger this modulation, the greater should be 759 
the response of the vmPFC to different valences of updating. Furthermore, we expected that 760 
the strength of the connection from vmPFC towards dmPFC would also correlate with the 761 
optimism bias, assuming that this coupling represents the influence of valuation on ongoing 762 
cognitive processing. Modulation parameters and coupling patterns in the context of favorable 763 
and unfavorable updating are reported in Table 4 and plotted in Figure 4C. On average, the 764 
coupling from dlPFC to vmPFC decreased in the context of unfavorable updating relative to 765 
favorable updating. However, this difference did not reach significance due to the large 766 
variance of modulation estimates for U and F. It is of greater importance though that the 767 
valence-dependent modulation of the dlPFC-vmPFC coupling (the difference between F and 768 
U, F-U) correlated with the size of the optimism bias across subjects (Figure 4D). This 769 
relationship explains how the data observed in the fMRI analysis were caused. Subjects with a 770 
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greater optimism bias had a stronger valence-dependent filtering by vmPFC, resulting in an 771 
increased BOLD response to favorable than unfavorable updating in vmPFC. Moreover, the 772 
individual strength of the coupling from vmPFC to dmPFC also correlated with optimism bias 773 
(both correlations corrected for multiple comparisons). Thus, the stronger the optimism bias, 774 
the stronger was the influence of valuation on ongoing cognitive processing, mediated by the 775 
coupling from vmPFC to dmPFC. In addition, the inspection of all possible correlation 776 
coefficients (Table 4) revealed that the endogenous self-connection of the dmPFC inversely 777 
correlated with the optimism bias (not corrected for multiple comparisons). Thus, the stronger 778 
the optimism bias, the weaker was the self-inhibition of the dmPFC. Taken together, these 779 
parameter estimates indicate a self-enhancing cyclic flow between vmPFC and dmPFC. In 780 
subjects with high optimism bias, the vmPFC filtered the incoming information dependent on 781 
valence. This differential signal was then forwarded to the dmPFC and there enhanced by the 782 
reduced self-inhibition.  783 
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Discussion 784 
 785 
The present study provides converging evidence that the value of desirable beliefs can 786 
influence ongoing cognitive processing. Participants demonstrated an optimism bias as they 787 
were more likely to update beliefs regarding their risks in response to good news than bad 788 
news (learning that base rates of the risks were lower versus higher than expected). This 789 
finding was also confirmed by computational modeling that formally controlled for valence-790 
unrelated variables that influence updating (estimation error and personal relevance of the 791 
new information; Shah et al., 2016; Kuzmanovic and Rigoux, 2017). Given that we i) ruled 792 
out these alternative, valence-independent explanations, ii) manipulated the desirability of the 793 
new information independently of prior beliefs, and iii) demonstrated that the optimism bias 794 
was unrelated to the size of risk estimates or base rates, we conclude that information 795 
integration was indeed biased by the motivation to adopt the most favorable beliefs about 796 
one’s future. 797 
Furthermore, fMRI results showed that the vmPFC tracked the value of updating. In 798 
the context of good news, large updates toward lower risk estimates improve the ultimate risk 799 
perception, but after bad news, large updates toward higher risk estimates worsen the ultimate 800 
belief. In turn, small updates (small or no change in beliefs) also acquire opposing values in 801 
the context of good and bad news, respectively: While small updates after good news are 802 
unfavorable as they disregard the opportunity to improve risk estimates, small updates after 803 
bad news are favorable because they prevent worsening of risk estimates. The activity pattern 804 
in the vmPFC showed exactly this pattern: it increased with increasing updates toward lower 805 
risks (after good news), and with decreasing updates after bad news. Thus, not only 806 
improving beliefs, but also avoiding the worsening of beliefs triggered the vmPFC activity. 807 
Previous studies on optimism bias that included risk estimates for self and a similar other 808 
person already indicated a positive value of avoiding threatening belief updates by 809 
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disregarding undesirable new information. Here, particularly the decreased updating in self-810 
related trials with bad news (relative to a comparably high amount of updating in self-related 811 
trials with good news and all other-related trials) was driving the optimism bias (Kuzmanovic 812 
et al., 2015, 2016a). Furthermore, research on context dependency of option values has shown 813 
that both gaining a reward (i.e., improving the current state, e.g., change from 1$ to 2$) and 814 
knowingly avoiding punishment (i.e., current state is unchanged, e.g., 1$, but the possible 815 
loss, e.g., -1$, is avoided) acquired a positive value and were tracked by the vmPFC 816 
(Palminteri et al., 2015). Lesion studies (Camille et al., 2011) and meta-analyses (Yarkoni et 817 
al., 2011; Diekhof et al., 2012; Levy and Glimcher, 2012; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and 818 
Rangel, 2014; Chase et al., 2015) have consistently shown that vmPFC was associated with 819 
valuation of rewards. In light of this literature, our results highlight that not only external 820 
rewards such as food or money, but also intrinsic rewards such as favorable beliefs, recruit the 821 
same valuation system. Moreover, the vmPFC was shown to automatically encode the value 822 
of objects (faces, houses, and paintings), independently of the explicit task instruction 823 
(Lebreton et al., 2009). In line with this automatic valuation and studies demonstrating 824 
unconscious motivational influences (Pessiglione et al., 2007), debriefing in our study 825 
revealed that subjects were unaware of their valence-dependent updating indicating that the 826 
valuation of belief updates need not require a voluntary process. 827 
Extending previous work (Kuzmanovic et al., 2016a), the tracking of valence by 828 
vmPFC could be uniquely attributed to update sizes, above and beyond the influence of 829 
estimation errors, personal relevance of errors, actual base rates or final risk estimates. In 830 
other words, valence of updating depended on improvement or worsening of final beliefs 831 
relative to initial beliefs, irrespective of the beliefs or the new information per se. Moreover, 832 
we hypothesized that the valence-tracking effect in the vmPFC would be more pronounced in 833 
subjects with greater optimism bias, because belief formation should be biased by the desire 834 
to make favorable updates only if favorable updates also have a positive value. While 835 
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favorable future outlooks are likely to be experienced as pleasant, the sensitivity to the value 836 
of such prospects may differ among individuals, dependent on their current state or their 837 
personality. Indeed, subjects with a stronger optimism bias exhibited a greater valence-838 
tracking effect in the vmPFC, confirming that the vmPFC activity is sensitive to the subjective 839 
value of stimuli (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Winecoff et al., 2013). 840 
But what was the mechanism underlying this valence-dependent recruitment of the 841 
vmPFC that was able to influence ongoing belief formation? One possibility is that in the 842 
context of favorable (relative to unfavorable) updating, the vmPFC amplified incoming 843 
signals and further influenced other prefrontal regions. Alternatively, vmPFC may be 844 
influenced by other prefrontal regions, whose activity have already been modulated in a 845 
valence-dependent manner. We tested these competing hypotheses by comparing dynamic 846 
causal models comprising regions differentially recruited during favorable and unfavorable 847 
updating. The models consisted of three nodes with distinct functional signatures: the dlPFC 848 
represented an “update processing” node that received the exogenous input, the vmPFC was 849 
included as the “valuation” node, while the dmPFC represented a “cognitive” node. The 850 
dlPFC was a part of an extended network that was generally involved in updating (both 851 
favorable and unfavorable). The same region was also engaged in tracking errors in base rate 852 
estimates, while the strength of this tracking was predictive of individual learning rates. In 853 
contrast, both vmPFC and dmPFC showed greater activity for favorable than unfavorable 854 
updating. Having demonstrated that the vmPFC tracked the valence of belief updating in a 855 
strictly-controlled task-related manner, we use the label “cognitive” node for the dmPFC to 856 
distinguish it from the valuation-related vmPFC. While we cannot specify the exact kind of 857 
cognitive processing associated with the dmPFC recruitment, recent meta-analyses indicate 858 
clear functional dissociations with vmPFC being selectively associated with reward-related 859 
tasks, and dmPFC being preferentially involved in cognitive processes such as social 860 
inferences and perspective taking (Bzdok et al., 2013; de la Vega et al., 2016). In the context 861 
 36 
 
of reconsidering one’s own risk with respect to that of others, social inferences and 862 
perspective taking seem highly plausible, and their valence-guided use may provide the means 863 
of arriving at a particular, preferred conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Shepperd et al., 2002). 864 
The Bayesian model comparison identified an optimum dynamic causal model, that 865 
had a reciprocal information flow from dlPFC via vmPFC to dmPFC, with a valence-866 
dependent modulation of the coupling from dlPFC to vmPFC. This shows that particularly the 867 
vmPFC filtered the incoming signal in a valence-dependent manner and influenced the 868 
dmPFC accordingly. Importantly, both of these circuit features predicted individual 869 
magnitudes of the optimism bias. Subjects with a stronger optimism bias showed a greater 870 
increase in the dlPFC-vmPFC coupling during favorable (relative to unfavorable) updating. 871 
Moreover, biased belief updating was greater, the stronger the transmission of this valence-872 
dependent signal from vmPFC to dmPFC was. Thus, the magnitude of the influence of 873 
valuation on ongoing cognitive processing, mediated by the coupling from vmPFC to dmPFC, 874 
predicted how much participants were biased towards more favorable updates. This finding 875 
complies with previous studies on functional connectivity, where the increase in connection 876 
between vmPFC ([3 51 -16]) and dmPFC ([-15 56 37]) predicted greater context-initiated 877 
reevaluation of choice options across subjects (Rudorf and Hare, 2014). 878 
Previous studies on effective connectivity identified the vmPFC as a target of the 879 
directional influence of other regions. The coupling from hippocampus to vmPFC was 880 
increased when people chose better remembered options (Gluth et al., 2015). Furthermore, the 881 
coupling from dlPFC to vmPFC was increased during decisions to resist tempting short-term 882 
rewards and to choose greater, but delayed rewards instead, and this effect was predictive of 883 
between-subject differences in delay discounting (Hare et al., 2014). These and our findings 884 
share the general idea of dynamic reciprocal influences between the valuation system and 885 
other cognitive systems. However, our study is the first to show the opposite direction of 886 
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influence, namely the influence of the vmPFC on the dmPFC that mediates value-guided 887 
belief formation. 888 
In the resulting mechanistic model of belief formation, the valuation of ongoing 889 
conclusions influences further cognitive processing, which in turn determines the final belief. 890 
Thus, our results provide novel evidence for the notion that motivation to maximize pleasant 891 
beliefs reinforces those cognitive processes that are most likely to yield favorable 892 
perspectives. Leaving no possibility of reinterpretation of the observed effects in entirely 893 
valence-independent terms, we substantially contribute to resolving the still persisting “hot 894 
versus cold cognition” controversy (Kunda, 1990). As soon as we have a preference for one 895 
conclusion over another, we may be in danger of automatically adjusting the knowledge we 896 
recall and the inferential rules we apply in such a way as to support the preferred conclusion. 897 
This bias in our reasoning has far-reaching implications for diverse decisions we make in our 898 
everyday life, be it in a private or in professional contexts. While it can serve to protect from 899 
discouraging and gloomy beliefs, it may also promote risk underestimations and 900 
discriminating judgments.  901 
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Figures and Figure Legends 1044 
 1045 
Figure 1. Outline and examples of experimental trials. 1046 
The figure illustrates the outline of experimental trials, including hypothetical trial examples. 1047 
Each experimental trial consisted of four succeeding events: With respect to a specific adverse 1048 
life event (e.g., cancer), subjects had to estimate the base rate (eBR) and their own risk (E1). 1049 
They were then presented with the actual base rate (BR) and had the opportunity to estimate 1050 
their own risk again (E2). After identical eBR and E1, the upper progression of the trial exam-1051 
ple shows a BR lower than expected indicating good news, while the lower progression shows 1052 
a BR higher than expected indicating good news. Estimation errors (EE) corresponded to the 1053 
difference between the estimated and the actual base rate, and the update corresponded to the 1054 
difference between the first and the second self-risk estimate. Note that in both trial examples, 1055 
the EE is 10 and the update is 8. For eBR, E1 and E2, subjects were instructed to use response 1056 
buttons to adjust the displayed number to match their estimate as soon as the number font 1057 
changed to green (after 2 seconds). Inter-stimulus intervals between eBR, E1, and E2, as well 1058 
as inter-trial intervals after E2, were jittered and consisted of a fixation cross (not shown 1059 
here).  1060 
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 Figure 2. Task performance and computational modeling.  1061 
A) Bars show subjects’ updates, that were significantly larger after good news (GOOD) than 1062 
after bad news (BAD). White dots represent simulations of updates by the ‘biased’ 1063 
computational model that assumes asymmetric learning rates for good and bad news (‘αA’, 1064 
two free parameters, Alpha and Asymmetry). Gray dots indicate simulated updates resulting 1065 
from the ‘unbiased’ model that assumes identical learning rates for good and bad news (‘α’, 1066 
one free parameter, Alpha). The simulated unbiased updates provide a normative benchmark 1067 
for rational updating with learning rates estimated for each subject under consideration of her 1068 
or his exact trial history. Error bars show standard errors. B) Bayesian model comparison 1069 
confirmed that the biased model ‘αA’ best predicted subjects’ updates. Model frequencies 1070 
show that the majority of subjects was best described by the ‘αA’ model, above and beyond 1071 
chance (red dashed line). Error bars show the posterior variance. C) Learning rates extracted 1072 
from the winning model αA were significantly higher after good than bad news. Error bars 1073 
show standard errors. D) Optimism bias (updateGOOD − updateBAD) and Asymmetry (estimated 1074 
for each subject by the model ‘αA’) were significantly correlated (dots represent single 1075 
subjects). E-F) Correlations between task variables separately for trials with good news (E) 1076 
and those with bad news (F).  * p < .05, **, p < .01.  1077 
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Figure 3. Brain regions encoding errors and the valence of belief updating. 1078 
A) When being confronted with the actual base rate, errors in base rate estimation (weighted 1079 
by the personal relevance) were tracked by the anterior cingulate cortex, the inferior frontal 1080 
gyrus, the anterior insula, the middle orbital gyrus and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 1081 
(dlPFC). The line chart shows that the activity in the dlPFC (representative of all clusters) 1082 
increased with decreasing error size (parametric modulation by error, negative correlation). Of 1083 
all the involved regions, only in the dlPFC did the magnitude of the error tracking correlated 1084 
with the general learning rate component Alpha (see scatter plot). Thus, subjects with a 1085 
stronger error tracking in the dlPFC also more strongly adjusted their initial beliefs in 1086 
response to errors. B) During the second risk estimation, the activity in the ventromedial 1087 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) encoded the valence of updating, adjusted for estimation error and 1088 
personal relevance. The gray box schematically illustrates the opposed valences of increasing 1089 
updates after good and bad news (in this example, eBR is equal to E1). After good news, large 1090 
updates are favorable as they ultimately change beliefs toward lower risk estimates and small 1091 
updates are unfavorable as they let the opportunity to improve risk estimates pass by. In 1092 
contrast, after bad news, large updates are unfavorable as they ultimately change beliefs 1093 
toward higher risk estimates and small updates are favorable because they prevent worsening 1094 
of risk estimates. Resulting valences are summarized in the table below: unfavorable (U), mid 1095 
(M) and favorable (F) updates. The line chart shows that the activity in the vmPFC tracked the 1096 
positive valence as it increased with increasing update sizes after good news but decreased 1097 
with increasing update sizes after bad news. The scatter plot shows that subjects with a greater 1098 
tracking of favorable updating in the vmPFC were also more optimistically biased in their 1099 
belief updating. A-B): The line charts and the scatter plots were not used for statistical 1100 
inference (which was carried out in parametric modulation and covariate analyses within the 1101 
SPM framework); they are shown solely for illustrative purposes. C) After demonstrating the 1102 
valence effect with the more precise parametric modulation analysis presented in B), a 1103 
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simplified analysis of updating was conducted as a basis for DCM. Here, all trials were 1104 
assigned to three valence categories: those with unfavorable (U), mid (M) and favorable (F) 1105 
updates (adjusted for estimation error). Conjunction across these three categories revealed a 1106 
distributed network involved in general updating, overlapping with the error tracking effect in 1107 
the dlPFC. Comparing trials with favorable and unfavorable updates revealed the differential 1108 
recruitment of the vmPFC and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) during updating. 1109 
The line charts show contrast estimates in the dlPFC, vmPFC, and dmPFC, respectively.  1110 
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Figure 4. Neurocircuitry mechanisms underlying optimistic belief updating. 1111 
A) Ten different dynamic causal models varying in intrinsic connectivity and contextual 1112 
modulation (unfavorable and favorable updating, U and F) were specified. The model space 1113 
encompassed three brain regions involved in updating: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), 1114 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). B) 1115 
Bayesian model selection revealed that the model m1 best explained subjects’ BOLD signal, 1116 
above and beyond chance (red dashed line). In this model, the coupling between dlPFC and 1117 
vmPFC was differentially modulated by unfavorable and favorable updating. Hence, the 1118 
vmPFC filtered the incoming information in a valence-dependent manner, and furthermore 1119 
influenced the dmPFC. C) Connectivity parameters derived from m1 show that the coupling 1120 
between dlPFC and vmPFC tended to be weaker in the context of unfavorable relative to 1121 
favorable updating. D) Optimism bias correlated with two parameters of m1 (highlighted in 1122 
red): Differential modulation of the dlPFC-vmPFC connection by favorable vs. unfavorable 1123 
updating (F-U), and the strength of the vmPFC-dmPFC connection (vmPFC::dmPFC). Thus, 1124 
subjects with a stronger optimism bias also demonstrated a greater valence-dependent filtering 1125 
of incoming information by vmPFC and a greater transmission of this differential signal 1126 
further to dmPFC.  1127 
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Tables 1128 
 1129 
Table 1. Task variables 1130 
 M (SD) p  
Parameter Good News Bad News  Source 
Number of trials 39.96 (1.45) 38.21 (2.38) .024  
Estimated base rate (eBR) 49.74 (12.67) 45.92 (12.30) .000 Participants’ response 
First estimate (E1) 42.64 (11.10) 37.85 (10.49) .000 Participants’ response 
Presented base rate (BR) 36.35 (12.57) 59.76 (12.22) .000 Base rate algorithm 
Estimation error (EE) 13.39 (0.95) 13.84 (0.57) .001 EE = |eBR - BR| 
Second estimate (E2) 35.12 (10.86) 44.55 (11.26) .000 Participants’ response 
Update 7.51 (2.58) 6.70 (2.20) .045 UpdateGOOD = E1 - E2, 
UpdateBAD = E2 − E1 
Personal relevance (PR) 0.70 (0.12) 0.69 (0.13) .287 for E1 < eBR:  
PR = 1 − ((eBR − E1) / (eBR − 1)) 
for E1 > eBR:  
PR =1 – ((E1 − eBR) / (99 − eBR)) 
for E1 = eBR: 
PR = 1 
RT eBR (s) 5.19 (0.84) 5.11 (0.80) .192 Participants’ response 
RT E1 (s) 3.25 (0.91) 3.30 (0.90) .461 Participants’ response 
RT E2 (s) 2.70 (0.62) 2.56 (0.61) .018 Participants’ response 
Note. All measures (except for number of trials) were recorded or computed for each trial, and were then aver-1131 
aged, separately for the conditions GOOD and BAD, and separately for each participant. Positive update values 1132 
indicated updates towards the BR, and negative values updates away from the BR (< 3% of the trials). PR: 1 in-1133 
dicates equal risk perception for the average and oneself; 0 indicates maximally different risk perception for the 1134 
average and oneself; note that PR corresponds to ‘relative personal knowledge’ in Kuzmanovic et al., 2017. RT, 1135 
reaction time. p values refer to paired two-tailed paired t-tests with n = 24.  1136 
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Table 2. Error coding during base rate presentation and its relation to the learning rate com-1137 
ponent Alpha 1138 
 
cluster peak 
 
size pFWE-corr 
 
size pFWE-corr 
 
1) Parametric modulation of BRGOOD and BRBAD by error     
a) Conjunction: PM_errorGOOD & PM_errorBAD, positive correlation    
No significant results       
       
b) Conjunction: PM_errorGOOD & PM_errorBAD, negative correlation    
Anterior cingulate cortex 63 0 5.18 10 34 20 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. triangularis) 45 0.001 4.09 46 44 0 
Anterior insula 37 0.001 4.05 28 22 6 
Middle orbital gyrus 30 0.002 4 16 50 -2 
dlPFCCOV_Alpha 32 0.004 3.81 40 40 28 
       
c) PM_errorGOOD > PM_errorBAD       
No significant results       
       
d) PM_errorBAD > PM_errorGOOD       
Cerebellum 48 0.001 6.9 -18 -76 -46 
Middle occipital gyrus 83 0.005 6.17 -34 -84 28 
Superior parietal lobule 47 0.006 6.15 24 -56 48 
       
Conjunction: PM_errorBAD, positive correlation & PM_errorGOOD, negative correlation 
Inferior occipital gyrus 22 0.001 4.16 40 -84 -10 
       
2) Covariate analysis of error coding with Alpha (masked with contrast 1b)  
dlPFC 12 .008 4.46 40 38 30 
Note. Error = EE * PR, based on the computational modeling of task performance. For significant differences 1139 
between PM_errorGOOD and PM_errorBAD we report global conjunction results to clarify whether the difference 1140 
relates to different magnitudes of the same modulation effect (e.g., the positive correlation between BOLD and 1141 
error was stronger in BAD than in GOOD), or to modulation effects of opposite direction (e.g., the correlation 1142 
between BOLD and error was positive in BAD, but negative in GOOD). COV_Alpha indicates that in this cluster the 1143 
magnitude of the error tracking correlated with the learning rate component Alpha across subjects (Covariate 1144 
analysis). dlPFC, dorsolateral Prefrontal cortex. Peak coordinates refer to the MNI space.  1145 
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Table 3. Activity during second estimation that was modulated by update 1146 
 
cluster peak 
 
size pFWE-corr T x y z  
1) Parametric modulation of E2GOOD and E2BAD by update     
a) PM_updateGOOD > PM_updateBAD       
vmPFC 49 0 5.63 -12 44 -16 
  0.01 5.40 -6 44 -20 
       
Conjunction: PM_updateGOOD, positive correlation & PM_updateBAD, negative correlation 
vmPFC 44 0 3.67 -8 46 -18 
  0.02 3.35 -10 54 -12 
       
b) PM_updateBAD > PM_updateGOOD       
No significant results       
       
c) Conjunction: PM_updateGOOD & PM_updateBAD, positive correlation   
No significant results       
       
d) Conjunction: PM_updateGOOD & PM_updateBAD, negative correlation 
Fusiform gyrus (V4) 816 0 7.33 28 -72 -8 
Lingual gyrus (V1)  0 4.59 6 -72 2 
Lingual gyrus (V3) 736 0 6.70 -10 -86 -6 
Superior occipital gyrus (V3)  0 4.11 -16 -88 18 
Superior occipital gyrus 231 0 5.17 22 -80 20 
Precentral gyrus  494 0 4.54 -32 -18 64 
Postcentral gyrus  0 4.34 -42 -26 54 
Fusiform gyrus 25 0.01 3.53 24 -46 -14 
       
2) Covariate analysis of valence coding with optimism bias  
a) Masked with contrast 1a, conjunction       
vmPFC 39 0 15.59 -6 50 -18 
       
b) Whole brain       
vmPFC 14 .011 7.28 -2 48 -18 
       
3) Three categories of E2: unfavorable, mid, favorable    
a) E2favorable > E2unfavorable       
vmPFCDCM 27 0 5.84 -2 46 -22 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 30 0.02 5.39 -16 44 40 
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b) E2unfavorable > E2favorable       
No significant results       
       
c) Conjunction: all 3 categories of E2       
Lingual gyrus (V3) 57571 0 24 24 -86 -12 
Fusiform gyrus   0 18.9 -30 -58 -14 
Lingual gyrus (V4)   0 18.7 -24 -86 -14 
Fusiform gyrus   0 16.4 32 -50 -18 
Inferior parietal lobule   0 14.8 -44 -40 48 
Inferior parietal lobule   0 12.6 50 -34 48 
Thalamus   0 8.38 20 -30 -2 
Middle frontal gyrus 6959 0 10.5 42 2 60 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. opercularis)   0 9.62 46 10 36 
dlPFCDCM   0 8.99 44 42 26 
dlPFC 1414 0 8.46 -28 52 28 
dlPFC   0 8.21 -40 30 32 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p.triangularis)   0 7.44 -34 34 24 
Thalamus 136 0 6.58 -8 -22 8 
Posterior cingulate cortex 125 0 6.13 -2 -24 28 
Precentral gyrus 23 0.01 5.65 34 -28 72 
Note. For significant differences between PM_updateGOOD and PM_updateBAD we report global conjunction re-1147 
sults to clarify whether the difference relates to different magnitudes of the same modulation effect (e.g., the pos-1148 
itive correlation between BOLD and update was stronger in GOOD than in BAD), or to modulation effects of 1149 
opposite direction (e.g., the correlation between BOLD and update was positive in GOOD, but negative in 1150 
BAD). vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Peak coordinates refer to 1151 
the MNI space.  1152 
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Table 4. DCM parameter estimates of the model m1 and correlations with measures of opti-1153 
mism bias 1154 
 M (SD) p 
t-test 
r 
Optimism bias 
p r 
Asymmetry 
p 
Matrix A       
dl::dl -0.01 (0.09) 0.000* -0.19 0.361 -0.21 0.323 
dl::vm -0.06 (0.12) 0.030 -0.23 0.277 -0.05 0.819 
vm::dl 0.10 (0.15) 0.000* -0.09 0.679 -0.15 0.485 
vm::vm -0.07 (0.09) 0.000* -0.20 0.348 -0.20 0.342 
vm::dm 0.15 (0.14) 0.000* 0.47 0.020* 0.49 0.015 
dm::vm 0.08 (0.124) 0.004* 0.27 0.207 0.32 0.127 
dm::dm -0.02 (0.03) 0.001* -0.49 0.015 -0.56 0.005 
Matrix B       
U on dl::vm -0.35 (1.06) 0.123 -0.23 0.275 -0.31 0.147 
F on dl::vm 0.05 (1.00) 0.822 0.49 0.015 0.36 0.088 
F - U 0.39 (1.42) 0.188 0.52 0.009* 0.48 0.018 
Matrix C       
U M F to dl 0.12 (0.07) 0.000 0.20 0.340 0.13 0.541 
Notes. Parameter estimates in Hertz, self-connections were log-transformed. dl, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 1155 
vm, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; dm, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; ::, endogenous connection; U, unfavora-1156 
ble updating; M, mid updating; F, favorable updating. *, equivalent to p < .05, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple 1157 
comparisons (Matrix A, t-tests, p < .007 corrected for 7 comparisons; r, optimism bias, p < .025 corrected for 2 1158 
comparisons with a priori hypotheses). 1159 




